So after a week of close camaraderie between the traditional allies – the EU and the US – in the G7, the NATO summit, the EU – US summit, one can confidently say that the transatlantic relationship is back.
They seem to be so much in love with each other that it is better to have a realistic look at their relationship. The EU and the US always had differences and it started to grow wider in the last two decades. But they always were close allies, cooperated in the multilateral institutions, consulted often in foreign policy issues, had mutual respect for each other, realize that the other is their biggest ally and there was constant engagement. But the overall relationship varied between the different US administrations, obviously.
Relationship with the Clinton administration was the closest in the last few decades where both their interests more or less aligned and Clinton got along very well with all the major European leaders. Marginal shift started during the Bush administration with its adventurous war in Iraq splitting Europe into Old Europe and New Europe. Obama was less a transatlanticist and he started shifting the focus from the EU to Asia. No doubt the Asia is becoming more and more important. But he made it at the cost of the EU and didn’t balance his interests. Foreign policy was never his forte and even less to talk about his foreign policy priorities aligning with the EU. Despite his red lines being violated in Syria, he did nothing. There was not much appetite from the US to get involved in another country. They have been stretched out already way beyond their means in Afghanistan and Iraq and both the stays becoming increasingly unpopular domestically. Nevertheless it would be construed as his foreign policy failure and it is one of the major reasons the Middle East is in this deep mess. The EU with no hard power and also not using its soft power sufficiently to rebuild Libya, Egypt and Tunisia failed badly without the US support which it is used to falling back on. The resultant is unstable governments in those countries and massive migrant problem that the EU is facing now. Relationship with the Trump administration was defined by not just having different views on almost every other issue but most often US went ahead unilaterally. He not only did not treat the EU as allies but also openly rebuked them and disrespected its leaders.
Now with Biden, the relationship is back to normal at least in terms of cordiality, multilateralism, process, trust, mutual respect, nice words for each other, willingness to cooperate but still fundamental differences remain. There was a start, at least, in various issues between them and this time it doesn’t seems to be just rhetoric. There seems to be a lot of energy, commitments and sincerity from both the sides. For all purposes it seemed that the transatlantic relationship reset was full fledged. The EU also needs to make maximum use of Biden in office, the most EU friendly President since Bill Clinton and make extra effort to find common ground.
State aid to Aircraft makers: It would have been too ambitious to expect that they would resolve the dispute, which lasted for 17 years in just 3 months. There have been billions of euros of punitive tariffs imposed on either side. But now they have agreed for a moratorium for 5 years with no punitive tariffs slashed on the other. In this period a Trade council would monitor compliance on the state aid given by either side and define what sort of subsidies can be allowed. This is a good start despite criticism that this is not enough. The EU made a positive gesture in May by holding off its retaliatory tariffs on US products to try to resolve this longstanding dispute between the allies. Some criticize that the truce is only for five years, but the fact that they have a mechanism to resolve that in the form of the Trade council and the threat of China also getting into aircraft manufacturing would make these two to settle their differences much more amicably.
Tariffs on Steel & Aluminium: The US still maintains the tariff despite the EU postponing its retaliatory tariffs on them giving them more time to remove the tariff barrier. Biden did agree that the EU is not a national security threat to the US, the precise reason with which the original tariffs were imposed by the Trump administration. When asked about the tariffs, Biden had asked for some more time, as it has been only 4 months since he took office. It is expected that the tariffs would be slashed and both would jointly fight against global excess steel production capacity.
Trade and Technology Council: This council would deliberate on what subsidies are allowed for the aircraft makers, steel tariffs and sort out other issues concerning trade between the two. Biden also proposed that this model could also be used to challenges posed by China’s economic model. This council would also set global standards on technological developments and includes export screening to check China’s digital ambitions worldwide. Certainly a good idea to launch this council but optimism must be tempered in global standard setting as traditionally the EU tends to have a more regulatory heavy approach than the US would be willing to go. The US prefers largely to leave it to the private players with light touch regulation. Nevertheless it is better to take the lead and not to leave it to authoritarian states like China, which is fast becoming a leading technology power. The EU’s competition policy in recent times has been criticized by the US although the US is also deliberating itself on how to tax the tech giants fairly. The EU also has taken a lead in coming up with its Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. The former would regulate online hate speech and disinformation, which would be a good basis for the EU and the US to cooperate. But with the Digital Markets Act, the EU has a lot of convincing to do with the US and to assure that it is not solely targeted against its Tech giants.
Data transfer agreement: After the short-lived EU – US Privacy Shield agreement on transatlantic data transfers was quashed by the ECJ in 2019. It has disrupted most of the companies that rely on the agreement amounting to billions of euros in digital trade. There needs to be a new data protection mechanism across the border soon. The EU is still waiting to hear from the US that how it’s citizen’s data would be protected in the US from its security agencies without judicial oversight. Here again, it is not sure how the US would balance its surveillance with EU citizen’s privacy rights. This is not going to be settled soon and easily.
Tax on Digital Giants: France, Austria, Spain and Italy have already imposed tax on the global technology giants, which the US is not happy about it. Although the OECD is trying for a tax on the tech giants among the OECD countries since last year and the US has proposed the global corporate minimum tax which would also include them, it is not happy that these countries have preempted that potential agreement and went ahead causing a comparative disadvantage them. The sooner the EU brings the US to its fold, the better.
Global Corporate minimum tax: Both the EU and the US are largely on the same page although few EU member states privately are unhappy about losing their competitive edge. If an agreement is found within the G20, it will be a major leadership initiative of the US supported by the EU, Canada and Japan.
Carbon border adjustment mechanism: The US doesn’t have an emission trading schemes similar to the EU and will have considerable opposition in the Congress in establishing one. It is still unsure how the US plans to meet its emission reductions except relying too heavily on the private sector besides individual states implementing rigorous regulatory mechanism. The US has always been a laggard in reducing carbon emissions not just during the Trump administration. The EU’s options are limited as well to achieve their high emission reduction ambition; it needs to stop carbon leakage and imposing carbon border tax seems to be their best option. The EU wouldn’t be in a position to postpone introducing the carbon border levy for too long.
Climate Change action plans: There is quite a bit of divergence between the two. First of all, the US reliance on shale gas is huge and increasing exponentially. As it is available in enormous quantity and it is cheap, the US would like to rely on them for the near future. But it is not exactly a climate friendly energy and the EU’s new taxonomy for sustainable investments doesn’t consider gas as clean energy. With levels of progress and ambition in adoption of renewable energy varying considerably and the EU’s taxonomy would make it difficult to jointly design a global regulatory framework for sustainable finance.
Brexit: The Biden administration, not being a supporter of Brexit unlike the Trump administration is a big relief to the EU. Biden being an Irish-American puts the Good Friday agreement all the more important. The EU would seem to have an edge in the US support in Brexit related conflicts with the UK.
Russia: For a long time, the EU was trying for a complicated balance with Russia, their neighbor, their main adversary and their main collaborator in major international issues. It cannot go too harsh on them for Russia’s adventures, as it needs Russia’s support in other international issues. But honestly, the EU’s policy towards Russia is a miserable failure and the major reason for that is the soft approach by its leading powers Germany and France repeatedly underestimating the danger from Russia. Dominated by them whose concern were only cooperation from Russia in geo-political issues. These two countries failed to listen to the Baltic countries, Poland, Czech Republic, who know about Russia much better than the others, in having a realistic policy towards Russia, a policy that it understands. Adding to the repeated criticism of EU’s Russia policy by the Lithuanians and the Polish, the EU Commissioner from Czech Republic, Vera Jourova claimed that she is sick of hearing EU officials and diplomats from the Western European countries that they know better how to handle Russia than those from the former Iron curtain states whom they termed as Russophobes. As it stands now, Russia treats the EU with disdain and Putin knows that the EU is not only toothless but also spineless. The EU either doesn’t sufficiently realise that or it shows its helplessness. Now that the US is firmly together with the EU, it could make things a bit less difficult for the EU to deal with Russia. The EU could do better with the support of the US to harden its policy against Russia.
China: The EU is trying for a difficult balance between its foreign policy priorities and trade priorities with China. But as China becomes more belligerent, the EU is also reacting to it by becoming more restrictive to China in terms of screening investments in the EU, making its displeasure of a lack of level playing field in China a lot more louder, diverting its supply chain mechanism away from China, targeting China’s human rights failure much more strongly than ever. The EU ditched a long negotiated Investment treaty with China (which to China’s credit has compromised quite a lot on giving way to a comparatively more level playing field to European companies in China) due to counter sanctions from the Chinese on EU’s sanctions (first in more than 30 years) on human rights violations in China. This is not a small shift from the EU side. So all these actions would make it a better partner to the US in dealing with its principal adversary much more effectively. Although this sentiment is not reflected that positively during the NATO summit, the statements made by France and Germany shouldn’t be taken too seriously as a deviation from the US. It is important to remember that the EU and China are each other’s biggest trade partners much more than the US. It is just that the EU wants it to be more balanced between trade and HR issues and not to be too antagonistic towards China and would want to have an open channel of communication with China to get their support in fighting against climate change and in other geo-political issues not least in reforming the WTO and WHO. This slight divergences would only have a better effect in making US line towards China a bit more nuanced softened by the EU and the EU line a bit more hardened with the support of the US.
WTO: After Trump disregarded the WTO and made it irrelevant, the Biden administration is back supporting the WTO but hasn’t yet revoked it’s blocking of the dispute resolution mechanism and is yet to fill the vacancies from its side. The EU also has to overcome its establishment of an alternate structure in WTO along with China, Canada and others to by pass the US when Trump discarded the WTO. It’s interesting that it needs WTO reformed now along with the Biden administration to counter China but it went ahead with China to establish an alternate structure earlier to counter Trump’s policies. Partners become adversaries and it gets reversed again.
The talk about the EU establishing a strategic autonomy already started during the Obama years and it made all the more sense during the Trump years. Now, as the relationship becomes normal and there is more and more cooperation and a lot gets achieved through multilateralism, the EU shouldn’t start becoming comfortable again falling back on its ally. It shouldn’t get back to the days where it is clubbed together with or even worse playing second fiddle to the US and lazily called as ‘West’. It should continue to focus on establishing strategic autonomy. This is not just because that it cannot expect the next President to continue to be closely aligned with the EU but as the differences widens between the allies in their priorities, the means to achieve differs and the need to go alone sometimes, it is better to be self-reliant. The EU needs to have an independent identity and not a hyphenated one.
What is strategic autonomy? First and foremost is to use its soft power to the maximum and strengthen its hard power. This means it needs to have an independent EU military capability complementing NATO capabilities. Of course it doesn’t have to duplicate the NATO capabilities as many member states in the EU fear of. The EU and strong proponents like France should convince the other m-s that this would not duplicate NATO capabilities. There is already the EDF to support the European Defense mechanism. It makes sense to pool all the EU m-s defence capabilities together. The trans-national rapid reaction force is already there and the importance is reinforced recently although this capability has never been used before.
There is a common saying that there are things that the EU does well such as trade negotiations, consumer protection and setting global standards and then there are things that the EU struggles with such as foreign policy. All EU’s failure on foreign policy cannot be blamed on the fact that it lacks majority decision making among the EU member states. The EU needs to be bold, decisive, think long term in its foreign policy. There needs to be constant deliberations, which have been missing.
The EU introduced an investment screening mechanism to screen investors from countries, which do not reciprocate its open procurement policy. This is mainly to deter investors from China and the US where Biden still has some ‘Buy American’ policies favouring domestic companies in public procurement. So it is a good sign that the EU is aware and quick to come up with a safeguard measure.
The EU needs to chart its own strategic course. Have a long term foreign policy goals towards every country in the Middle East, Russia and China as these three should be its priority and try to align as much as possible with the US. But wherever its long term goals necessitates itself to take action and if the US is not convinced about it or not willing to go along with the EU, the EU should be prepared and be capable enough to go on its own. It should also be careful that it doesn’t become a mere instrument for the US foreign policy agenda. This should be the aim of its strategic autonomy.